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What is the European Union? 
Ilann Margalit Maazel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is much debate about Europe these days. For the first time in 
European history, Germans, Italians, Spaniards, and citizens of nine 
other countries-some 302 million Europeans-are using the same cur-
rency, the euro. Within the European Community ("EC" or "Commu-
nity"), created over forty-four years ago, 1 Europeans enjoy the free 
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. They are protected 
from discrimination on the basis of their nationality and are "citizens" of 
the European Union ("EU" or "Union").2 
Yet, for all the talk of Europe, most "Europeans" still regard them-
selves as citizens of a nation state first, of a region or city second, and of 
Europe last, if at all. Many of the issues that most concern national gov-
ernments-defense, security, and foreign policy-remain almost exclu-
sively within the jurisdiction of national governments. There is no ques-
*Copyright r~: 2002 II ann Margalit Maazel (J.D. University of Michigan, 1997; University of 
Leiden Erasmus Program, Spring 1996; B.A. Harvard University 1993) is a lawyer at Emery Cuti 
13rinckcrhotT & Abady PC, and is the former law clerk to the Hon. John M. Walker, Chief Judge of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Mr. Maazel is also a Fellow at Coro 
Leadership New York and a previous recipient of the Echoing Green Public Service Fellowship. 
I. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC"}, renamed the 
European Community ("EC") in the 1992 Treaty on European Union, was signed on March 25, 1957 
and v.ent into fi:Jrce on January I, 1958. 
2. See TRI·AIY FSII\BLISIIIN<i Till: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
II, as amended hy Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) I [hereinafter EC 
!'REA IYI. Article 14 of the EC Treaty provides, in relevant part: "The Community shall adopt meas-
ures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market ... [which] shall comprise an area 
v. ithout internal tronticrs in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is en-
sured. ." Article 39 provides for the "[t]recdom of movement for workers." Article 17 provides: 
"Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member 
State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace na-
tional citizenship." 
All citations to the EC Treaty or the Treaty on European Union ('TEU") can be found at the 
European Union's ollicial website: http://www.europa.eu.int. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty renum-
bered almost all of the articles in the EC Treaty and the TEU. See Appendix A (Table of selected 
renumbered articles before and alter the Amsterdam Treaty). Although many cases cited in this es-
say refer to the pre-Amsterdam Treaty article numbers, the essay refers to the article numbers as 
presently constituted in the FC Treaty and TEL!. 
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tion that France, Great Britain, Germany, and other EU members remain 
autonomous, individual nation states. 
And yet they are joined in union. What is this Union? An economic 
market that purports to provide "citizenship": created by treaty, yet 
quasi-constitutional. Neither nation nor federation nor economic cartel. 
The legal debate over what the EU is lies at the surface of a critical 
political debate: what should Europe be? Those who advocate a Euro-
pean superstate tend to believe the EU is already a superstate. Those who 
oppose further European integration believe the EU is a limited, eco-
nomic union of sovereign nations. 3 At the heart of this political debate lie 
issues dear to every European: issues of national identity, Europe's cul-
tural and economic position in the world, and Europe's place in a history 
marred in the Twentieth Century by two brutal world wars. 
Mindful of the political debate, but (largely) leaving that debate to 
others, this essay asks simply: what is this Union? What makes the 
documents creating the Union treaties, and what makes them constitu-
tions? What stands between union and federation or nation? Through an 
analysis of the Union's history, institutions, and legal framework, this 
essay ultimately explores how the Union must be changed if, as Euro-
pean constitutionalists would have it, Europe is to move ever closer to-
wards a common political future. 
II. TREATIES V. CONSTITUTIONS 
Before delving into the EU, we tum to guiding principles: what is a 
treaty and what is a constitution? 
A "treaty" is "a generic term embracing all instruments binding at in-
ternational law concluded between international entities, regardless of 
their formal designation."4 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties defines "treaty" as "an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law .... "5 ln short, 
treaties are contracts, between sovereign nations, governed by interna-
tional law. 
Constitutions share none of these attributes. A constitution is 
3. The parallels in the United States are hard to ignore. Those who advocate limited federal 
government, states' rights, and "federalism" as that term is presently understood tend to believe that 
the Constitution already places strict limits on federal power. Those who advocate a more expansive 
federal government tend to interpret the Constitution more broadly. 
4. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Treaty Reference Guide, at http://untreaty.un.org/ 
English/guide.asp#treaties (last visited Apr. 6, 2002). 
5. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedji1r signature May 23, 1969, art. 
2( I )(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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[t]he organic and fundamental law of a nation or state, which may be 
written or unwritten, establishing the character and conception of its 
government, laying the basic principles to which its internal life is to be 
conformed, organizing the government, and regulating, distributing, 
and limiting the functions of its different departments, and prescribing 
the extent and manner of the exercise of sovereign powers. A charter of 
government deriving its whole authority from the govemed.6 
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A constitution is not an agreement between states, but among a peo-
ple to create a state. "The true difference" between "a league or treaty, 
and a Constitution," according to James Madison, is the difference be-
tween "a system founded on the Legislatures [or nation states] only, and 
one founded on the people."7 
A constitution is the fundamental law of a nation, not a mere com-
pact or contract. Constitutions "by definition establish[] the basic princi-
ples and laws of a nation or state; [while] an international treaty [or a 
compact] ... specifies the contractual rights and duties of (more than 
one) distinct sovereign states. "8 These "basic principles" usually include 
certain fundamental rights of citizens, the right of free speech, freedom 
of religion, due process, etc. Constitutions also create powerful institu-
tions (legislatures, courts, executives) with significant powers to interpret 
and enforce this fundamental national law. 
And unlike treaties, constitutions are not governed by international 
law. A constitution, as the fundamental law within a nation, can be inter-
preted only according to the rules of the constitution itself. 
Ill. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN INTERNATIONAL 0RGANIZA TION 
A. The Community and Union Were Created by Treaties 
At first glance, both the EC Treaty and Treaty on European Union9 
("TEU", collectively, "the Treaties") are plainly treaties. Formed shortly 
after the Second World War, the EC was created to integrate Europe so 
that war among European nations would become impossible. 10 Both 
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214-15 (6th ed. ]990) (citations omitted). 
7. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 533 (1969). 
8. Steve J. Boom, The European Union After the Maastricht Decision: Will Germany Be the 
.. Virginia of Europe"", 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 177, 209 (1995). 
9. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C224) [hereinafter TEU]. 
10. As stated by the European Union's official website: 
In spring 1950 Europe was on the edge of the abyss. With the onset of the Cold War, the 
threat of conflict between its eastern and western halves loomed over the continent. Five 
years after the end of World War Two, the old enemies were still a long way from recon-
ciliation. What could be done to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past and to create the 
right conditions for a lasting peace between such recent enemies? The nub of the problem 
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Treaties were created from the top down by acts of government, not 
"peoples." The EC Treaty (Article 313) and TEU (Article 52) were 
signed by European foreign ministers, required ratification by "the High 
Contracting Parties [participating European states] in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements," and entered into force upon 
"ratification by the last Signatory State." 11 The TEU entered into force 
after ratification by ten national legislatures or parliaments and three na-
tional referenda. 12 On the whole, the TEU received considerably more 
support in national legislatures of the member countries than among their 
own citizens. 13 Plainly "the European legal order started its life as an 
international organization in the traditional sense .... " 14 
The Treaties' text supports this view. The Treaties refer to them-
selves as treaties, not as constitutions, nor as "basic" or "fundamental" 
law. 15 Both begin with "HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE 
BELGIANS" and other heads of signatory states, "leaving no room for 
doubt that the parties to [the Treaties] ... are the sovereign states of 
Europe, not the 'people of Europe. "' 16 Their preambles aspire to an "ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe," not a "state based upon a 
European people."17 The EC Treaty "[r]esolve[s] to ensure the economic 
and social progress of [the participating] countries," and affirms "the 
constant improvements of the living and working conditions of their 
peoples." 18 The TEU delicately "[d]esir[es] to deepen the solidarity be-
tween [its] peoples while respecting their history, their culture, and their 
was the relationship between France and Germany. A link had to be forged between the 
two, and all the free countries in Europe had to be united around them so that they could 
work together on building a community with a shared destiny. It was Jean Monnet, with 
his unique wealth of experience as a negotiator and man of peace, who suggested to the 
French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, and the German Chancellor, Konrad Ade-
nauer, that a community of interest be established between their countries .... 
Pascal Fontaine, Seven Key Days In the Making ol Europe, at http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/chrono/ 
40years/ 7days/en.htm. 
II. EC TREATY art. 313; TEU art. 52. 
12. See Sophie Vanhoonacker, From Maastricht to Karlsruhe: The Long Road to Ratifica-
tion, in TilE RATIFICATION OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 3, 10-13 (Finn Laursen et al. eds., 1994). 
Denmark had one parliamentary vote and two referenda. See id. 
13. See id. The Danish case is illustrative: after winning a 130-25 vote in parliament, the 
TEU suffered a narrow defeat in the initial referendum. See id. 
14. J.H.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: 
Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411,419 (1996). 
15. Theodor Schilling, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order. An Analysis ol Possi-
ble Foundations, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 389, 393-94 (1996). 
16. Boom, supra note 8, at 208. 
17. Manfred Brunner v. The EU Treaty, BVerfGE 89, 188 (1993). 
18. EC TREATY pmbl. (emphasis added). 
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traditions," but makes plain that "[t]he Union shall respect the national 
identities of its Member States." 19 
The EU's history of ratification and the Treaties' text both suggest 
that these are traditional treaties among autonomous nation states. 
B. Amendment/Withdrawal/Permanence 
Other features of the Union are also intergovernmental, not constitu-
tional. The Treaties prohibit any amendment without ratification by 
every member state?0 Such prohibitions are common in treaties, and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes this rule as the 
standard?' The rationale is plain: any amendment over a member's ob-
jection would irreparably violate national sovereignty. If a treaty is sim-
ply a contract among countries, no country can be bound by provisions to 
which it did not agree. 
By the same token, sovereign nations must have the power to with-
draw from treaties if their people so desire. Most treaties explicitly pro-
vide for withdrawal, if given with proper notice. 22 The TEU and EC 
Treaty are officially "concluded for an unlimited period."23 No provision 
in the Treaties either authorizes or prohibits withdrawal by member 
states. 24 This omission is ambiguous. It could suggest that any member 
state may withdraw from the Treaties at any time, even without notice. 
Yet, as in constitutions~which often do not provide any mechanism for 
19. TEU pmbl. See also TEU art. 6 (emphasis added). 
20. See TEU art. 48; EC TREATY art. 308. 
21. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 40, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39/27 
( 1969). "The amending agreement does not bind any State already a party to the treaty which does 
not become a party to the amending agreement." !d. 
22. See, e.g, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 65, 312 U.N.T.S. 221. "A High Contracting Party may denounce the 
present Convention only after the expiry of five years from the date on which it became a Party to it 
and after six months' notice contained in a notification addressed to the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe .... " !d. Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. XVI, 28 U.S.T. 227. 
"Either of the Contracting Parties may terminate this Treaty at any time by giving notice to the other 
through the diplomatic channel. In that event the Treaty shall cease to have effect six months after 
the receipt of the notice .... " !d. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection 
of Investments, Sept. 29, 1982, U.S.-Egypt, art. Xlll, 21 I.L.M. 927. "Either Party may, by giving 
one (I) year's written notice to the other Party, terminate this Treaty at the end of the Initial ten (10) 
years period or at any time thereafter." !d. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
art. XV, 33 I.L.M. 1143. "Any Member may withdraw from this Agreement. Such withdrawal shall 
apply ... upon the expiration of six months from the date on which written notice of withdrawal is 
received by the Director-General of the WTO." !d. 
23. TEU art. 51; EC TREATY art. 312. 
24. See MAURO CAPI'FI.I.I'lTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 353 
(1989). 
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states to withdraw25 -the omission may also imply that no state may 
withdraw absent amendment to the Treaties themselves. 
The Treaties' transitional nature, however, places them firmly within 
the category of treaties, not constitutions. Although the TEU and EC 
Treaties were explicitly "concluded for an unlimited period,"26 both were 
substantially amended-the EC by the TEU and the TEU by the Amster-
dam Treaty in 1997. The text ofthe TEU is transitional by its own terms. 
For example, the TEU's Common Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP") 
calls for the "progressive framing of a common defence policy ... which 
might lead to a common defence ... .'m The TEU resolves "to mark a 
new stage in the process of European integration," to "continue [not 
complete] the process of creating an ever closer union .... "28 
Constitutions are intended to be enduring, not transitional. Treaties 
are merely agreements among nations. They can be replaced or dissolved 
if enough signatory states withdraw. As transitional documents, the Trea-
ties do not fit the constitutional bill. 
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SUPERSTATE 
A. European Union Powers 
The above discussion suggests that the Treaties are treaties like any 
other. They were signed and created by nation states, not a European 
people; they require unanimous agreement by all signatory states to 
amend; and they are transitional by their own terms. Why, then, did the 
European Court of Justice describe the EC Treaty as "the basic constitu-
tional charter" ofEurope?29 
We begin with an analysis of EU powers. A constitution gives the 
central government vast powers. 30 The EU does not yet have the power 
to declare and conduct a war or to raise and support a European military. 
By its own terms, the TEU's CFSP aspires to but does not reach this 
goal. 31 Despite some efforts, European states have always rejected a 
25. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. 
26. TEU art. 51; EC TREATY art. 312. 
27. TEU art. 17. 
28. TEU pmbl. 
29. Case 294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339. See also Opinion 1/91, 1991 
E.C.R. 6079 (reaffirming the EC Treaty as "the constitutional charter of a community based on the 
rule oflaw."). 
30. The United States Constitution, for example, gives the federal government the power to 
lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to 
raise and support armies and navies. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 1-3, 11-13. 
31. Article 17 of the TEU, calling for the "progressive framing of a common defence pol-
icy ... which might lead to a common defence," illustrates the CFSP's aspirational nature. TEU art. 
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common defense.32 Nor can the EC lay and collect taxes directly from 
the people; EC nationals write no year-end check to a European Revenue 
Service. 
Yet the EC does have substantial power. The Council can and has 
forced member states to pay the costs of participation in the Union (e.g., 
to absorb new member states or eliminate economic imbalances among 
member states )-costs ultimately borne by citizens of member states. 
That is a tax of a kind. The EC has the power to regulate commerce. The 
Community's common market objective is the source of enormous eco-
nomic powers, distinguishing the EC Treaty from every other interna-
tional treaty in history. The Community may regulate the movement of 
goods, labor, capital, and enterprise within the EC. 33 The Community 
establishes antitrust or "competition" law .34 Pursuant to Article 95 of the 
EC Treaty, the Community may, by qualified majority, pass directives to 
harmonize laws of the member states that affect the internal market. 35 
Such directives concern social and economic policy, including "health, 
safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection .... "36 The 
EC has used Article 95 to regulate the law of consumer contracts,37 pub-
lic works contracts/8 tort liability for defective products,39 copyright,40 
and trademark.41 
As Jacques Rueff, former deputy governor of the Bank of France, 
stated in 1950, "Europe will be united by its money or it will never be 
made."42 The last half century has proven Rueffs point. The EC has be-
17 (emphasis added). Nor may the EU adopt a CFSP without unanimity on the Council. See TEU art. 
23. It should be noted, however, that the Amsterdam Treaty, signed on October 2, 1997 largely in 
response to Europe's failed Yugoslavia policy, somewhat strengthened the CFSP. See The Amster-
dam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide; Introduction, at http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/ 
leg/en/lvb/a09000.htm; The Amsterdam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide; Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy, at http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/ al9000.htm. 
32. The most notable attempt, the European Defence Community, was rejected by the French 
National Assembly in 1954. See CLIVE C. CHURCH & DAVID PHINNEMORE, EUROPEAN UNION AND 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 15 ( 1994 ). 
33. See EC TREATY arts. 25, 28, 29, 39, 43, 49. 
34. See EC TREATY arts. 81-82. 
35. See EC TREATY art. 95. 
36. EC TREATY art. 95. 
37. Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95). 
38. Council Directive 71/305, art. l(a), 1971 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 185/5) 682, amended by 
89/440, 19890.J.(L210/l). 
39. Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 21 0/29). 
40. Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122/42). 
41. Council Directive 891104, 1988 O.J. (L 4011 ), amended by 92110, 1992 O.J. (L 6/35). See 
BLACKSTONE'S EC LEGISLATION 373-78, 378-86, 427-40, 453-57, 458-64 (Nigel G. Fostered., 6th 
ed. 1995). 
42. Etching the Notes of a New European Identity, INT'I. HERALD TRIB. (Vienna), Aug. 3, 
2001,atl. 
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come a sort of economic constitution, "an economic giant but a political 
dwarf."43 
B. Necessary and Proper Clause 
The EU is given additional power through the EC Treaty's "neces-
sary and proper" clause, which states: 
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of 
the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, 
the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commis-
sion and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate 
44 
measures. 
Article 308 is extremely broad on its face. It authorizes the Commu-
nity to take "appropriate measures" wherever necessary to "attain ... one 
of the objectives of the Community," even where other articles have not 
provided the necessary powers. Under Article 308, the Council can look 
to the broad purposes of Articles 2 and 3 to enact Community law. Such 
objectives could include "raising ... the standard of living and quality of 
life [in the EC],"45 achieving "economic and social cohesion and solidar-
ity among Member States,"46 or even contributing to "the flowering of 
the cultures of the Member States."47 
The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has interpreted Article 308 
expansively. The Court first defined "necessary" to allow the Council to 
rely upon Article 308 even where the Treaty has provided alternative le-
gal bases.48 The Court then took a broad "approach to the term[] 'objec-
tives,"' considering Community objectives above and beyond any enu-
merated Treaty powers.49 In Massey-Ferguson, citing the Community 
objective of "establish[ing] a customs union," the Court empowered the 
Council to create a "uniform determination of the valuation for customs 
purposes of goods imported from third countries. "50 Although not in the 
context of Article 308, the Court has also identified "European unity" as 
the "objective of all the Community treaties."51 Commission v. Council 
43. NICHOLAS HOPKINSON, THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER MAASTRICHT 21 ( 1992). 
44. EC TREATY art. 308. 
45. EC TREATY art. 2. 
46. !d 
47. EC TREATY art. 3( I )(q). 
48. See Case 8/73, Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson, 1973 E.C.R. 897. 
49. Boom, supra note 8, at 204. 
50. Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven, 1973 E.C.R. at 907. Article 2 of the EC Treaty identifies the 
establishment of an "economic and monetary union" as a Community purpose. 
51. Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. 6079-6080. 
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identified the "achievement of a people's Europe" and "strengthening the 
interaction between citizens in different Member States" as Community 
objectives. 52 The Court justified scientific research subsidies under Arti-
cle 308, citing the need for "stimulation of training and mobility of re-
searchers in the Community,"53 presumably to strengthen the interaction 
between citizens in different member states. 
The ECJ has not stood alone in its broad interpretation of Article 
308. The member states and the Council also favor such expansive appli-
cation. In the Paris Summit Conference of 1972, the member state gov-
ernments "agreed that, for the purpose of carrying out . . . enlarged 
tasks ... it is desirable to make the widest possible use of all of the pro-
visions of the Treaties, including Article 235 [now Article 308] of the 
E.E.C. Treaty."54 The Council based 491 Community acts exclusively or 
partially on Article 308 between 1973 and 1989 alone.55 
On its face and as interpreted by the ECJ, Article 308 permits any 
Community legislation with a "nexus" to the "operation of a market,"56 
for example, "the purchase of equipment for national armed forces" to 
promote the "free flow of goods," or the "harmonization of diploma 
equivalences" to pursue the "free flow of persons."57 
Perhaps the EU is not such a political dwarf after all. 
C. The EU's Institutions 
Many treaties create or are enforced by institutions. The Agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organization created a Dispute Settlement 
Body to resolve disputes among nations. 58 The American Convention on 
Human Rights provides for an Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights and Court of Human Rights. 59 Other treaties, such as the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women60 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,61 create weaker institu-
tions or no institutions at all. 
52. Case 242/86, Commission v. Council, 1989 E.C.R. 1425, 1429. 
53. /d. 
54. Christoph Sasse & Howard C. Yourow, The Growth of Legislative Power of the Euro-
pean Communities, in I CoURTS AND FREE MARKETS 92, 96 (Terrance Sandalow et al. eds., 1982). 
55. See Boom, supra note 8, at 226 n.l49. 
56. EC TREATY art. 308. 
57. Sasse and Yourow, supra note 54, at 96. 
58. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, annex 2, art. 
I, 33 I.L.M. 1143. 
59. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 33-73, 9 l.L.M. 673. 
60. See Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 
18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33. 
6 I. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448. 
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But no treaty in history created institutions like those in the EU. The 
EU has four "branches" of government: a parliament, a supreme court, 
an executive branch, and a quasi-legislative council of member states. 
The Council, still the EU's main decision-making body, consists of rep-
resentatives of the member governments. It exercises legislative power 
with the European Parliament, shares budgetary authority with Parlia-
ment, and on occasion concludes, on behalf of the EU, international 
agreements with one or more States or international organizations. 
The Parliament is directly elected every five years by the people of 
Europe. It shares legislative power and budgetary authority with the 
Council and approves the nomination of Commissioners who collectively 
comprise the EU's executive branch. 
The Commission consists of members nominated by common 
agreement of the member governments and approved by Parliament. As 
the EU's executive branch, the Commission initiates and presents draft 
legislation to Parliament and the Council, implements European legisla-
tion, ensures that Community law is properly applied, and represents the 
Union in negotiating international agreements. 
These institutions are "endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise 
of which affects Member States and also their citizens."62 Through Arti-
cle 220,63 the EC also became "the only treaty-based system equipped 
with a court which may be approaching the role of a constitutional court 
in a federal system."64 The ECJ consists of justices appointed by com-
mon agreement of the member governments. 
D. Direct Effect of Community Law 
In addition to its vast powers and powerful institutions, the EU has a 
legal structure that is entirely constitutional in nature. As noted above, 
constitutions "by definition [establish] the basic principles and laws of a 
nation or state; [while] an international treaty [or a compact] ... speci-
fies the contractual rights and duties of (more than one) distinct sover-
eign states."65 To establish such basic laws, constitutions apply a su-
preme federal law, enforceable by powerful federal institutions, directly 
to the people. The Community legal order embodies these constitutional 
principles. 
62. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12. 
63. Article 220 provides: 'The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and ap-
plication of this Treaty the law is observed." EC TREATY art. 220. 
64. Terrance Sandalow & Eric Stein, On the Two Systems: An Overview, in 1 CoURTS AND 
FREE MARKETS I, 4 (Terrance Sandal ow et al. eds., 1982). 
65. Boom, supra note 8, at 209. 
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"The existence of direct relations between individuals and central in-
stitutions is ... generally taken to be a defining characteristic of a federal 
system."66 The famous Van Gend & Laos decision established the princi-
ple of direct effect of Community law,67 reversing the "normal presump-
tion of public international law whereby international legal obligations 
are ... addressed to states."68 Thus, Community law applies both (verti-
cally) between member states and individuals and (horizontally) between 
private individuals. 69 Individuals are the "principal 'guardians' of the le-
gal integrity of Community law" through the Article 234 preliminary rul-
ing procedure, which permits individuals to rely on Community law in 
private suits and requires national courts to refer issues of Community 
law to the ECJ and defer to ECJ holdings concerning these Community 
laws. 70 The principle of direct effect and the preliminary ruling procedure 
remain generally accepted by courts of member states.71 
E. Supremacy of Community Law 
A constitution must also establish the supremacy of federal law. 
Costa v. ENEL and subsequent decisions have established both the su-
premacy of Community law within its sphere of competence and the 
Community's "Kompetenz Kompetenz," or ability to define its sphere of 
competence. 72 Unlike treaties, EC law prevails over national laws passed 
later in time. Because the ECJ declared Community law "mandatory and 
absolute," "a legal system in its own right which forms part of the legal 
system of the Member States,"73 member state courts must refuse to ap-
ply state laws that conflict with directly effective Community law. 
66. Sandalow & Stein, supra note 64, at 15. 
67. Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at I. 
68. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transjbrmation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413 (1991 ). 
69. It is not necessary to explore here the differences between regulations, directives, etc., 
which apply with horizontal and/or vertical direct effect under different circumstances. It is impor-
tant only that the EU, when it desires, can create laws with vertical and horizontal effect. 
70. Weiler, supra note 68, at 2414; TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY LAw 246 (2d ed. 1988). Article 234 of the EC Treaty provides in relevant part: 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the 
interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions 
of the Community ... ; [and] (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by 
an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide. Where such a question is raised be-
fore any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers 
that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the 
Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
EC TREATY art. 234. 
71 See Mark L. Jones, The Legal Nature of the European Community: A Juri.1prudential 
Analysis Using H. L. A. Hart's Model of Law and a Legal System, 17 CoRNELL ]NT'L L. J. I, 48 
(1984). 
72. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585. 
73. Case I 06/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 
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Although the EC Treaty contains no express "Supremacy Clause," 
the supremacy of Community law is rooted in the EC Treaty's text. Un-
der Article 228, "[i]f the Court of Justice finds that a Member State has 
failed to fulfill an obligation under this Treaty, the State shall be required 
to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court 
of Justice."74 This Article implies the supremacy of Community law: 
why else would member states be required to fulfill Treaty obligations 
that could conflict with national laws? 
Article 230 gives the ECJ judicial "review" over Community institu-
tions to rule on their lack of competence or infringement of the Treaty. 
Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Luebeck-Ost reiterated that national courts 
"have no jurisdiction to declare that acts of Community institutions are 
invalid."75 Foto-Frost appealed to "the very unity of the Community le-
gal order," to "the fundamental requirement of legal certainty," and to 
the ECJ's unique competence to interpret Community law.76 
Article 234 gives the ECJ jurisdiction over "the interpretation of 
[the] Treaty" and requires the highest national courts to refer Community 
questions of law to the ECJ for preliminary rulings. 77 Spa International v. 
Amministrazione Delle Finanze Delio Stato reaffirmed Article 234' s core 
purpose: "to ensure that community law is applied uniformly by national 
courts."78 Although the ECJ can only interpret Community questions of 
law in cases referred by national courts, Article 234 imposes upon na-
tional courts "the obligation to refer a case for a preliminary ruling, as 
soon as the judge perceives either of his own option or at the request of 
the parties that the litigation depends on a [question of Community 
law]. "79 
Needless to say, no comparable provisions exist in any other treaty. 
This legal order-supremacy of Community law, direct effect of Com-
munity law upon individual citizens-is the stuff of nationhood and of 
true constitutions. 
629, 633. 
74. EC TREATY art. 228. 
75. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Luebeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, 4199-200. 
76. !d. at 4200. 
77. EC TREATY art. 234. 
78. Case 66/80, Spa International v. Amministrazione Delle Finanze Delio Stato. 1981 
E.C.R. 1191; see also Case 166/73, Rheinmuehlen v. Einfuhr, 1974 E.C.R. 33, 38. "Article 177 [now 
Article 234] is essential for the preservation of the Community character of the law established by 
the Treaty and has the object of ensuring that in all circumstances this law is the same in all States of 
the Community." !d. 
79. Rheinmuehlen, 1974 E.C.R. 33, 38. 
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V. THE UNION: NEITHER INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION NOR 
SUPERSTATE 
The EU in many ways looks like a constitutional superstate. EU law 
applies directly to EU citizens and supercedes the laws of member states. 
The TEU and EC Treaties are interpreted according to EU law (as set 
forth by the ECJ), not simply international law. The EU has a supreme 
court, an executive branch, and two legislative branches. It has vast pow-
ers not found in any other treaty. 
Yet the EU was also created by "treaty" and almost entirely 
"founded on the Legislatures" and governments of nation states, not "on 
the people."80 It is little wonder that commentators have struggled to 
place the EU in any historical, legal, or political context. Some refer to 
"constitutionally protected Community rights,"81 others to Europe's 
"nascent federal system."82 Others note that "while it is clear that the 
European Community is not a federal state, it is equally clear that it ei-
ther has or reflects many such characteristics .... The European Com-
munity falls quite genuinely between the accepted categories of legal and 
political organization."83 
The ECJ has had few problems characterizing the Community as a 
"new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states 
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields,"84 with 
"its own legal system ... of unlimited duration, having its own institu-
tions, its own personality, its own legal capacity ... stemming from a 
limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of power from the States to the 
Community"85 -in short, as Europe's "basic constitutional charter."86 
But there are weaknesses in characterizing the Community as a 
"constitutional charter." The "people of Europe" have yet to "adopt the 
existing text of the treaties as their own constitution ... [b ]y developing 
a custom and a corresponding opinio juris over time,"87 an approach that 
would parallel the UK model.88 And though national courts have, until 
80. Wooo, supra note 7, at 533. 
81. F.G. Jacobs, Constitutional Developments in the European Community and the Impact of 
the Single European Market Afier 1992, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 887,894 (1990). 
82. Sandalow & Stein, supra note 64, at 14. 
83. John W. Bridge, American Analogues in the Law of the European Community, 11 
ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 130, 137 (1982). 
84. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. I, 2. 
85. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 586. 
86. Case 294/83, Les Verts v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339; see also Opinion 
1191, 1991 E.C.R. 6079 (reaffirming the EC Treaty as "the constitutional charter of a community 
based on the rule oflaw. "). 
87. Schilling, supra note 15, at 395-96. 
88. See id. at 409 n.36. The Danish reaction to EC Treaty Article 17 (as amended by the 
TEU), establishing EU citizenship, is illustrative. Denmark issued a "Unilateral Declaration" accom-
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recently,89 unanimously accepted the principles of direct effect and su-
premacy of Community law, acceptance of constitutionalization in a pe-
riod of unanimous decision-making in the Council is limited evidence of 
opinio juris. The ECJ decided Van Gend & Laos, Costa and Simmenthal 
long before the Single European Act shifted much Community decision-
making to majority voting.90 As Weiler notes: 
Unlike the state governments of most federal states, the governments of 
the Member States, jointly and severally, could control the legislative 
expansion of Community jurisdiction/competences/powers. Nothing 
that was done could be done without the assent of all the States. This 
diffused any sense of threat and crisis on the part of governments [and 
courts] .... How convenient to be able to do in Brussels what would 
often be politically more difficult back home, and then exquisitely 
blame the Community! 91 
In addition, Article 308, the "necessary and proper" clause, does not 
create quite the political giant its broad text initially suggests. That is be-
cause Article 308 requires unanimity by the Council to pass legislation.92 
It is the unanimity of the member states, not Article 308, that is the ulti-
mate source for the broad "Community" powers under this Article. Here 
the Treaties are again treaties, permitting autonomous nation states to 
pursue objectives of mutual interest when they unanimously agree to do 
so. 
VI. TOWARD A CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE? 
The EU is a work in progress, part treaty and part constitution. In the 
past months, France and Germany have hinted at a new structure for 
Europe based upon a true constitution.93 In order for Europe to adopt a 
constitution, it must do so honestly and openly. A European superstate or 
panying the TEU asserting that "Nothing in the [TEU] implies or foresees an undertaking to create a 
citizenship of the Union in the sense of citizenship of a nation-state." BLACKSTONE'S EC 
LEGISLATION, supra note 41, at 146-47. The declaration forced the Council to formally reassure 
Denmark that EU citizenship does not "in any way take the place of national citizenship." !d. Note 
that Article 17 states explicitly that "Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace na-
tional citizenship." /d. 
89. See the "Maastricht" opinion of the German constitutional court, asserting the power of 
national courts to be the "final judge of the allocation of European and Member State competences." 
Manfred Brunner v. EU Treaty, BVerfGE 89, 155, 187-88 (1993). 
90. The Single European Act came into force on July 1, 1987. 
91. Weiler & Haltern, supra note 14, at 444. 
92. See Weiler, supra note 68, at 2483 n.120. 
93. See, e.g., Chirac Sets Sights on Euro Constitution, BBC News (Aug. 28, 2001 ), available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uklhi/english/world/europe/newsid_l513000/1513080.stm; German President 
Johannes Rau, Address at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, at http://www.bundespraesident. 
de/top/ dokumente/Rede/ix_35628.htm (Apr. 4, 2001) (calling for a European constitution to create a 
federation of European nation states). 
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superfederation with a European constitution requires a conscious, in-
formed decision by Europeans to cede national sovereignty. If any coun-
try desires to enter into such a state, its citizens-not its government-
must choose to do so by referendum. No constitution can be ratified by 
"HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE BELGIANS," et al. without the 
full participation and approval of the European people themselves. 
Amendment of any such constitution cannot require the unanimous 
vote of constituent states. No political union, if it is to represent well the 
will of all states, can be held hostage to the desires of any single state. 
Similarly, the exercise of EU powers, including those under Article 308 
necessary and proper to further EU objectives, should only require a ma-
jority or two-thirds support of the European people, not the unanimous 
vote of European states. For the EU to legislate in furtherance of Com-
munity objectives effectively, constituent states can have no veto. 
It must also be understood that states may not under any circum-
stances secede from this union unless the union dissolves or is replaced. 
Constitutions, unlike treaties, are not optional or transitional legal obliga-
tions that can be renounced with a few months notice. 
No true European state or federation can exist without a single 
mechanism to achieve a common foreign policy and defense. That means 
that European institutions-not Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac-will 
forge a common immigration policy, antiterrorism policy, and a common 
army with a single command structure and commander in chief. 
It is not sufficient that Community law apply directly. The EU must 
also establish basic, individual rights for all European citizens, whether 
French, Italian, or German. Every constitution includes the equivalent of 
a Bill ofRights. 
EU institutions must also be reorganized. What place does a Council 
of nation states have in a superstate or superfederation? Perhaps, at best, 
the Council can serve as Parliament's upper chamber. The EU's execu-
tive branch must also be directly accountable to the European people or 
Parliament, presumably in the form of a president or prime minister. If 
the EU is to be a superfederation or a superstate, its executive branch 
must be represented by a person directly accountable to Europeans, not a 
Commission of largely invisible, albeit well-meaning, bureaucrats. 
These are significant changes, and Europe may not be ready for them 
politically, socially, or psychologically. Given the enormous historical, 
linguistic, cultural, and political differences among the ever-increasing 
group of EU nations, such a superstate created by a European constitu-
tion is unlikely and probably unworkable. Perhaps then the Union is best 
left substantially as is, neither treaty nor constitution, neither nation nor 
federation. In its present state, Europe will continue to realize the bene-
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fits of economic union without facing the psychological crisis and politi-
cal division any substantial loss of national sovereignty would inevitably 
create. Such a Union not only benefits Europe; it is a Union to which all 
Europeans can agree. 
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Appendix A: Table Of Selected TEU and EC Treaty 
Articles Renumbered by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
Article# Before Article# After 
Amsterdam Treaty Amsterdam Treaty 
EC Treaty 
7a 14 
8 17 
12 25 
30 28 
34 29 
36 30 
48 39 
52 43 
55 45 
59 49 
75 71 
85 81 
86 82 
lOOa 95 
104 101 
104c 104 
113 133 
119 141 
164 220 
171 228 
173 230 
177 234 
223 296 
235 308 
238 310 
240 312 
247 313 
TEU 
R 52 
F 6 
N 48 
Q 51 
L 46 
